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Security	informed	safety:	if	it’s	not	secure,	it’s	not	safe.	
Kate	Netkachova	and	Robin	E	Bloomfield,	Adelard	LLP	and	City	University	London	
	
Society	relies	on	the	safe	functioning	of	computer	based	networks	and	systems	whether	it	is	in	
transportation,	in	energy	production,	banking	or	in	medical	devices.		In	some	sectors,	notably	high	
hazard	ones,	achieving	and	assuring	safety	is	a	relatively	mature	undertaking	-	although	of	course	we	
must	not	be	complacent	[20,21].	The	advent	of	cyber	issues	brings	enormous	challenges	and	
changes	to	the	traditional	engineering	tempo	and	approach.	This	is	exacerbated	by	the	increasing	
sophistication	of	attackers,	the	commoditisation	of	low-end	attacks,	the	increasing	vulnerabilities	of		
digital	systems	as	well	as	their	connectivity	-	both	designed	and	inadvertent.	In	our	research	and	
practice	we	have	been	considering	the	impact	of	cyber	issues	on	safety	critical	and	safety	related	
computer	systems
1
.	This	article	shares	some	of	the	issues	and	lessons	learned.	
Safety	engineering	
Safety	systems	are	engineered	depending	on	their	criticality	which	ranges	from	less	critical	safety-
related	systems,	whose	malfunction	may	potentially	compromise	safety	and	might	lead	to	accidents	
with	marginal	or	negligible	severity,	to	highly	critical	systems,	whose	failure	or	malfunction	can	
result	in	death	and	serious	injuries	to	people,	damage	to	property	or	the	environment
2
.	Achieving	
and	assuring	safety	is	a	specialist	activity	and	rigorous	safety	analysis	is	performed	to	identify	and	
mitigate	hazards.		A	wide	spectrum	of	analysis	techniques	is	deployed	to	achieve	and	assure	the	
system.	Techniques	such	as	static	source	code	analysis,	statistical	testing,	reliability	modelling,	event	
trees,	FMECA,	FTA,	formal	methods	and	proofs	are	used	at	different	stages	of	the	system	lifecycle	to	
analyse	system	failures	and	minimise	safety	risks.		
If	it	is	not	secure	it’s	not	safe	
When	dealing	with	safety	and	security	terminology	is	important	as	the	different	communities	can	
use	the	same	terms	to	mean	different	concepts,	and	have	different	terms	for	different	concepts.	In	
this	short	article	we	clarify	the	difference	by	noting	that		
• safety	is	concerned	with	protecting	the	environment	from	the	system	whereas		
• security	is	concerned	with	protecting	the	system	from	the	environment.		
Traditionally,	security	and	safety	have	been	treated	as	separate	disciplines,	with	their	own	
regulation,	standards,	culture	and	engineering.	This	approach	is	increasingly	becoming	infeasible	as	
there	is	a	growing	realization	that	security	and	safety	are	closely	interconnected:	it	is	no	longer	
acceptable	to	assume	that	a	safety	system	is	immune	from	malware	because	it	is	built	using	bespoke	
hardware	and	software,	or	that	it	cannot	be	attacked	because	it	is	separated	from	the	outside	world	
by	an	“air	gap”.	In	reality,	the	existence	of	the	air	gap	is	often	a	myth	[1].	A	safety	justification,	or	
safety	case,	is	incomplete	and	unconvincing	without	a	consideration	of	the	impact	of	security.	
Impact	on	safety	of	cyber	
We	have	used	the	Claims,	Argument,	Evidence	(CAE)	framework	(See	summary	in	Table	1	and	[3][4])	
to	analyse	the	impact	of	security	on	a	safety	justification	or	safety	cases	and	we	found	that	a	
																																								 																				
1
	We	use	the	term	“safety	systems”	to	cover	all	of	these	categories	
2
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significant	portion	of	a	security-informed	safety	case	will	need	to	change	to	address	security	
explicitly	[2].	In	some	instances	this	will	lead	to	substantial	changes	to	the	design,	the	
implementation	process	and	the	justification.	For	example,	the	following	areas	are	particularly	
significant	from	a	security	perspective	and	need	more	scrutiny	in	a	security-informed	justification	of	
a	safety	system:	
• Supply	chain	integrity.	
• Malicious	events	post	deployment,	that	will	also	change	in	nature	and	scope	as	the	threat	
environment	changes.	
• Weakening	of	security	controls	as	the	capability	of	the	attacker	and	technology	changes.	
This	may	have	major	impact	on	proposed	lifetime	of	installed	equipment	and	design	for	
refurbishment	and	change.	
• Security	considerations	are	likely	to	challenge	the	effectiveness	and	independence	of	safety	
barriers.	
• Design	changes	to	address	user	interactions,	training,	configuration,	and	vulnerabilities.	This	
might	lead	to	additional	functional	requirements	that	implement	security	controls.	
• Possible	exploitation	of	the	device/service	to	attack	itself	or	others.	
Don't	pay	twice	for	assurance	
 
There	are	technical	drivers	to	integrate	security	into	safety	analyses	–	because	of	the	interactions	
and	trade-offs	that	are	necessary	to	consider.	For	example	at	the	requirements	stage	we	might	need	
to	consider	how	the	security	aspects	of	the	information	flow	policy	under	attack	or	degraded	plant	
conditions	impact	the	safety	or	we	might	need	to	consider	at	the	architecture	level	whether	that	
highly	critical	third	party	component	does	have	sufficient	security	provenance	given	its	supply	chain.		
	
There	are	a	variety	of	initiatives	to	integrate	security	into	hazard	analyses.	We	have	been	using	
security	(or	cyber)	informed	Hazops	to	assess	architectures	of	industrial	systems	and	in	this	we	adapt	
this	well	known	approaches	with	additional	security	guidewords	and	an	enhanced	multi	disciplinary	
team.	Another	area	where	there	is	common	ground	between	security	and	safety	is	in	static	analysis	
of	code.	Both	security	and	safety	perspectives	are	needed	to	assess	the	likelihood	of	vulnerabilities	
being	exploited	and	the	effectiveness	and	consequences	of	their	mitigations.	
	
There	are	also	business	drivers	to	integrating	safety	and	security,	as	stakeholders	do	not	want	to	pay	
twice	for	assurance,	or	worse,	find	they	have	conflicts	between	safety	and	security	that	significantly	
impact	project	timescales	and	require	considerable	rework	or	re-architecting	of	the	system.	
	
Need	resilience	as	well	as	safety	
Another	finding	from	our	analysis	of	the	security	of	industrial	safety	critical	systems	is	that	
availability	becomes	an	issue	as	many	systems	(e.g.	in	rail	transport,	power	plants)	are	designed	to	
fail-stop.	This	safety	bias	makes	denial	of	service	attacks	relatively	easy.	When	we	combine	this	with	
the	difficulty	of	understanding	the	design	basis	threats	and	the	attractiveness	of	many	embedded	
system	targets	we	must	plan	for	incident	recovery	and	adaptation:	in	other	words	systems	need	to	
be	resilient.	This	is	a	particularly	true	for	critical	infrastructures.	
Most	critical	infrastructures	are	reliant	on	the	software-based	information	systems,	which	control	
their	operation,	monitor	activities,	and	provide	real-time	response	to	incidents	and	events.	The	
recent	attack	on	the	Ukrainian	power	grid	demonstrated	how	vulnerable	critical	infrastructures	can	
be	to	malicious	actions.		
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On	the	23
rd
	December	2015,	in	Ukraine	a	destructive	malware	wrecked	computers	of	several	
regional	distribution	power	companies	and	wiped	out	sensitive	control	systems	for	parts	of	the	
power	grid,	causing	power	outages	and	blackouts.	According	to	the	public	record,	an	unauthorized	
intrusion	disconnected	7	substations	(110	kV)	and	23	(35	kV)	substations	leading	to	an	outage	for	
80,000	customers.	The	attack	was	very	well-coordinated	and	comprised	of	multiple	different	
elements,	including	a	denial-of-service	to	the	phone	systems,	a	direct	interaction	from	the	
adversary,	and	the	malware	itself	installed	on	workstations	and	servers	to	enable	the	attack	[	5].	
This	crafted	attack	can	be	considered	the	third	public	example	of	targeted	intrusions	leading	to	
outages	or	physical	damage	available	to	date,	along	with	the	well-known	Stuxnet	and	the	German	
Steelworks	facility	attacks	[19].		Fortunately,	significant	cyber-attacks	causing	outages	and	physical	
damage	are	still	relatively	rare.	More	often	we	see	cyber	attacks	on	corporate	IT,	data	and	
operational	technology.	These	attacks	lead	to	financial	losses,	violations	of	privacy,	reputation	issues	
and	also	affect	people	and	technology	that	support	industrial	processes	opening	up	opportunities	for	
designing	future	attacks	with	more	severe	consequences.	
One	recent	example	of	such	potential	attack-enabling	intrusion	was	an	incident	with	the	Israeli	
power	grid.	In	January	2016,	one	of	the	employees	at	Israel's	Electricity	Authority,	a	government	
department	in	the	country's	Ministry	of	Energy,	opened	a	phishing	email	and	was	infected	with	
ransomware	which	subsequently	spread	to	other	computers	in	the	network.	If	the	problem	hadn’t	
been	quickly	identified	and	resolved,	it	could	have	easily	resulted	in	outages	and	other	serious	
consequences	using	control	gained	over	power	grid	components	[7].	
Model-based	approach	needed	to	deal	with	scale	and	tempo	
The	drivers	for	a	more	model-based	approach	are	a	need	to	
• Address	the	scale	and	connectivity	of	systems	
• Deal	with	uncertainties	in	structure	and	to	understand	and	evaluate	systemic	risks	
• Interpret	and	analyses	incidents	to	guide	mitigation	and	recovery	strategies	
• Provide	rebuttal	and	commentary	on	events	as	appropriate.		
• For	many	complex	systems,	especially	the	critical	ones,	it	is	often	impossible	to	perform	live	
analysis.	Instead,	a	model	of	a	system	operating	in	a	simulated	environment	is	constructed.	
There	are	many	approaches	to	modelling	infrastructure	and	interdependencies	[12,13].	In	our	
approach	[8,9]	–	Probabilistic	Interdependency	Analysis	(PIA)	–	we	look	at	both	qualitative	and	
quantitative	aspects	of	assessment.		The	models	are	in	part	probabilistic	and	part	deterministic	and	
include	appropriate	service	models,	documenting	assumptions	about	resources,	environmental	
impact,	threats	and	any	other	factors.	The	modelled	systems	are	studied	with	an	operational	
environment	where	cyber-attacks	are	introduced	with	an	explicit	adversary	model.		
A	key	concept	of	the	PIA	methodology	is	representing	the	system	components	as	continuous-time	
state	machines.	The	simulation	of	the	state	machines	by	the	PIA	tool	produces	series	of	events	that	
are	then	aggregated	to	calculate	the	metric	of	interest.	Typically,	the	metrics	are	various	“loss	
functions”,	e.g.	the	number	of	failed	components,	the	duration	of	non-working	state	of	a	particular	
component	or	a	combined	characteristic	of	many	components’	states.	Statistical	analysis	of	the	
metric	data	is	enabled	by	repeating	the	simulation	multiple	times.	Although	our	models	are	abstract	
and	less	detailed	than	some	design	models	they	are	themselves	complex	software	that	produces	
non-intuitive	results.		
Need	to	trust	models	
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This	type	of	model-based	approach	and	probabilistic	design	are	fundamental	to	the	evaluation	of	
critical	infrastructures	and	we	need	to	be	sure	we	can	trust	these	models.	The	models	are	
complicated	and	rely	on	complex	software	for	their	calculations.		We	have	experimented	with	using	
the	CAE	assurance	framework	to	support	an	analysis	of	their	trustworthiness.	
In	this	approach	we	first	focus	on	defining	the	precise	claims	we	are	making	about	the	systems	and	
making	the	assumptions	about	the	adversary	environment	explicit.	This	highlights	the	need	to	
consider	various	types	of	attacks,	defining	them	in	terms	of	capability,	frequency	and	to	justify	that	
they	adequately	represent	the	possible	attacks	on	the	system.		
Having	established	the	claim	we	are	making	of	the	real	system	under	its	design-basis	attacks	we	
substitute	it	with	a	claim	about	a	model	under	the	simulated	attacks.	When	such	a	substitution	is	
made,	it	is	essential	to	justify	the	argument	that	the	model	is	adequate	for	the	specific	purpose	it	is	
being	used	for.	Not	only	should	the	model	of	the	system	adequately	represent	the	actual	system,	the	
model	of	the	usage	should	be	realistic	and	the	model	of	the	environment	should	be	adequate.	The	
evidence	we	use	can	be	varied,	e.g.	scientific	papers,	insider	knowledge,	external	expert	analysis,	
validation	testing	of	the	tools,	benchmarks	and	so	forth.	
The	CAE	framework	supports	the	justification	by	helping	elicit	the	claims	we	are	making,	identifying	
the	arguments	we	are	using	to	support	or	refute	the	claims	and	indicating	what	evidence	we	have,	if	
any	to	justify	what	we	are	claiming.		It	provides	the	basis	for	challenge	and	peer	review.	
The	security-informed	safety	case	would	require	us	to	provide	convincing	evidence	that	the	models	
of	the	system,	its	usage	and	the	environment	are	realistic	and	represent	those	in	real	life.		
Need	to	respond	to	claim	and	counter-claim	
In	gathering	such	evidence,	a	detailed	analysis	is	performed	and	it	is	not	uncommon	to	untangle	
various	claims	and	lines	of	argument	that	are	not	necessarily	true.	One	well-known	example	of	such	
a	claim	is	the	presentation	by	Hugo	Teso	at	the	Hack	in	the	Box	security	summit	in	April	2013	[11]	
claiming	that	it	is	possible	to	hijack	airplanes	with	an	Android	phone.	Using	a	flight	simulator,	Teso	
showed	off	the	ability	to	control	an	airplane	remotely,	by	sending	radio	signals	to	its	flight-
management	system	to	change	the	direction,	speed	and	altitude	of	the	plane.	The	detailed	analysis	
of	the	models	in	a	proper	security-informed	safety	case	would	show	that	the	simulated	use	and	the	
modelled	environment	are	not	realistic	and	would	help	with	the	rebuttal	that	the	hack	
demonstrated	using	the	flight	simulator	would	not	be	possible	on	the	actual	certified	flight	systems.	
Conclusion	
The	engineering	of	computer	based	safety	systems	needs	to	explicitly	address	cyber	issues	and	from	
the	work	we	have	been	involved	with	cyber	has	a	very	significant	impact	on	the	claims	we	make	
about	systems,	the	arguments	and	evidence	we	use	to	justify	and	challenge	them.	We	have	found	
that	the	CAE	framework	provides	an	approach	to	evaluate	the	impact	and	trade-offs	and	support	
innovation	as	we	move	to	a	more	model	based	approach	to	support	system	complexity	and	the	
assurance	tempo	that	is	now	needed.	
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The	key	elements	of	the	Claims,	Argument,	Evidence	(CAE)	approach	
are:	
Claims,	which	are	assertions	put	forward	for	general	acceptance.	They	
are	typically	statements	about	a	property	of	the	system	or	some	
subsystem.	Claims	that	are	asserted	as	true	without	justification	
become	assumptions	and	claims	supporting	an	argument	are	called	
subclaims.	
Arguments	link	the	evidence	to	the	claim.	They	are	the	“statements	
indicating	the	general	ways	of	arguing	being	applied	in	a	particular	case	
and	implicitly	relied	on	and	whose	trustworthiness	is	well	
established”[Toulmin],	together	with	the	validation	for	the	scientific	
and	engineering	laws	used.	In	an	engineering	context	arguments	should	
be	explicit.	
Evidence	that	is	used	as	the	basis	of	the	justification	of	the	claim.	
Sources	of	evidence	may	include	the	design,	the	development	process,	
prior	field	experience,	testing	(including	statistical	testing),	source	code	
analysis	or	formal	analysis.	
	
In	order	to	support	the	use	of	CAE,	a	graphical	notation	is	used	to	describe	the	interrelationship	of	the	
claims,	argument	and	evidence.		
In	practice	the	desired	top	claims	we	wish	to	make	such	as	“the	system	is	adequately	secure”	are	too	
vague	or	are	not	directly	supported	or	refuted	by	evidence.	It	is	therefore	necessary	to	develop	them	into	
subclaims	until	the	final	nodes	of	the	assessment	can	be	directly	supported	(or	refuted)	with	evidence.	The	
basic	concepts	of	CAE	are	supported	by	an	international	standard	[3]	and	industry	guidance	[4].	A	recent	
comprehensive	review		[15,16]and	analysis	of	assurance	cases	is	provided	by	John	Rushby	in	[14].	
In	 the	 light	 of	 an	 empirical	 analysis	 of	 actual	 safety	 cases,	 we	 identified	 a	 number	 of	 basic	 building	
blocks	(CAE	blocks)	that	can	form	the	basis	for	describing	the	assessment.	The	blocks	are:	
• Concretion	blocks;	
• Substitution	blocks;	
• Decomposition	blocks;	
• Calculation	blocks;	
• Evidence	Incorporation	blocks.	
The	 resulting	 CAE	 structure	 supports	 the	 assessment	 being	 made,	 but	 in	 addition,	 there	 will	 be	
important	narrative	and	analyses	explaining	and	detailing	the	claims	and	arguments	being	made.	Narrative	
is	an	essential	part	of	the	assessment.	
 
Table	1:	The	CAE	Framework	
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